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ESQUIRE

MARCH 1

AN INQUIRY INTO THE DARKNESS OF THE CLOAK, The Sharpness of the Dagger

After Dies

After Diem and the Bay of Pigs, after Mossadegh and Arbenz, we must recognize the CIA for what it is and seemed in the control of the control

for what it is—and control it, says this outspoken Congressman

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by Rep. John V. Lindsay

Two major reversals in our foreign policy within the last three years have shaken the poise of the Intelligence branch of the United States government to its underpinnings: the abortive adventure at the Bay of Pigs, and the blinding miasma of United States policy that arose in South Vietnam during the Diem era.

The immediate dangers past, commentators have sought to unravel the confusing web of influences in both situations. The full truth is not yet known, and may never be. Nonetheless, it seems indisputable that in both cases the three principal instruments of U.S. foreign policy—the State Department, the military, and the Central Intelligence Agency—were at crucial times pulling in separate directions.

The criticism most frequently heard is that the C.I.A. was medding in policy, undertaking functions that were not its proper responsibility. The charge has been made that the C.I.A. was combining Intelligence gathering with active "operations," a course which carries the risk that Intelligence may be used to support prior operational decisions. It has been alleged over and over that in Vietnam, as in the Bay of Pigs, the C.I.A., with or without direction from higher authority, became enmeshed in its own intrigues. In the Bay of Pigs, the C.I.A. was found supporting a collection of Butista refugees, apparently without clear direction from the State Department. In Vietnam, it became clear that the C.I.A. was closely all gned with and subsidizing the Special Forces run by the late Ngo Dinh Nhu, an elite military force that raided the Buddhist pagodas. Responsible representatives of the press have reported at ong disagreements between the State Department and the C.I.A. with regard to policy in Vietnam, and these reports

with regard to policy in Victnam, and these reports must stand on Sanitized and Prophoved For Release Clark DF 9 000 258 R000 0300040074-3

The evidence was overwhelming that U.S. policy was confused and that the divisions within agencies were being hung on the public

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